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B. TIMOTHY HEINMILLER*

The Politics of "Cap and Trade"
Policies
ABSTRACT
This article explores thefundamentally political nature of cap and
trade resource management policies. It disaggregatesthese policies
into their three main processes (capping, allocation,and trading)
and outlines the distinctive distributive conflicts characteristicof
each. The Murray-Darling Cap on Diversions in southeastern
Australia serves as a detailed case study used to highlight these
conflicts, and evidence drawnfrom other cap and trade programs
around the world supports these observations. Recognizing the
politics of cap and trade policies helps to explain why these
programs do not always follow economic models and clarifies the
roles of governments and stakeholders in program design and
operation.
INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, cap and trade programs have emerged as a
common policy strategy for the sustainable management of scarce
resources. These programs establish an aggregate cap on resource
extraction, allocate private access and use rights to resource users, and
make these rights tradable so that, over time, these rights will tend to
gravitate toward their highest valued uses. Most analyses of cap and trade
programs have focused on ideal policy designs for achieving sustainability
and efficiency under a variety of circumstances while relatively little
attention has been paid to the actual design and implementation of these
policies in practice. Some recent work has recognized the operation of cap
and trade programs as fundamentally political in nature but has gone little
beyond this.1 This article explores and deconstructs the politics of cap and
trade policies by disaggregating these policies into their three main
processes - capping, allocation, and trading - and analyzing the distinctive
distributive conflicts involved in each. Recognizing the political nature of
these processes goes a long way toward explaining why many cap and
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trade programs do not accord exactly with economic models and sheds
additional light on the roles of governments and stakeholders in the
operation of these programs. This knowledge is important given the
widespread proliferation of these programs and their adoption for
managing some of the most important environmental challenges, including
global climate change under the Kyoto Protocol.
CAP AND TRADE POLICIES
Cap and trade policies belong to a family of resource management
policies that are variously referred to as "market-based" or "privatized" and
can be distinguished from a second family of resource management policies
that are generally referred to as "community-based" or "bottom-up."2 The
descriptors "market-based" and "privatized" obscure the fact that these
policies actually combine a significant degree of state involvement with the
establishment of private resource rights; in fact, in most instances these
private rights are created and perpetuated by the state in what was
previously a publicly or commonly held resource.3 This approach contrasts
significantly with "community-based" management, most closely
associated with the work of Elinor Ostrom, in which the state is peripheral
and common property resource rights are established locally through
collective action by resource users.4 Despite the obvious differences between
these two approaches, Carol Rose points out that both are fundamentally
based on the establishment of clear and recognized property rights, and that
real-life hybrids between the two are widely found.' The resource
management literature also suggests that both of these general approaches
have the potential to result in effective and robust resource management,
though the circumstances favoring each approach are still not entirely
clear.6
Within the family of market-based or privatized resource
management policies, the basic commonality is the creation of private
resource rights that limit access to the resource and are tradable amongst
resource users. Among market based approaches, Tom Tietenberg makes
a useful distinction between credit policies and cap and trade policies:

2. Carol M. Rose, Common Property, Regulatory Property, and Environmental Protection:
Comparing Community-Based Management to Tradable EnvironmentalAllowances, in THE DRAMA
OF THE COMMONS 233, 233 (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., 2002).
3. Id. at 235-36; LEIGH RAYMOND, PRIVATE RIGHTS IN PUBLIC RESOURCES: EQUITY AND
PROPERTY ALLOCATION IN MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2003).
4.

ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990).

5.
6.

Rose, supra note 2, at 236-37.
See, e.g., Rose, supra note 2.
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With a credit program, an individual access baseline is
established for each resource user. The user who exceeds
legal requirements (say by harvesting fewer fish than allowed
or emitting less pollution than allowed) can have the
difference certified as a tradable credit.
The cap-and-trade program involves an absolute baseline
and trades allowances rather than credits. In this case a total
resource
access limit is defined and then allocated among
7
users.
For resource management, the key difference between credit policies and
cap and trade policies is the manner in which each limits resource access
and use. In credit programs, the limitations are individually based and open
ended in the aggregate, while cap and trade policies establish an aggregate
limit bounding the collective use of individual rights holders.8 This means
that if the number of users in a credit program increases, aggregate resource
use will also increase (in the absence of any extraneous regulatory
constraints); however, a similar increase in the number of users in a cap and
trade program will result in the same aggregate use witl some or all users
getting a smaller slice of the resource pie.9 Socially, this difference is
significant because it means that relations between users are inherently zero
sum in cap and trade policies but not in credit policies, creating different
challenges and conflicts in the formation and implementation of these
distinctive policies. To keep the research task manageable, this article
focuses on the conflicts that shape cap and trade policies, setting credit
policies aside.
In their ideal conception, cap and trade policies combine the policy
goals of sustainability and economic efficiency and offer the potential to
achieve both simultaneously. The achievement of sustainability is most
closely linked with the "cap" part of cap and trade policies while the
achievement of efficiency is most closely linked with the "trade" part. By
implementing a cap, stakeholders and regulators are afforded an
opportunity to limit aggregate resource use to a level within the bounds of
sustainability, allowing the resource to be preserved and used far into the
future. In the case of pollution control regimes, such as cap and trade
policies to control carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and sulfur dioxide, the
resource in question is the environment's assimilative capacity, its finite

7. Tom Tietenberg, The Tradable PermitsApproach to Protecting the Commons: What Have
We Learned?, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 197, 204.
8. Id. at 204.
9. Id.
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ability to absorb pollutants without causing damage. ° In economic theory,
the allocation and trading of resource rights-within the bounds of a
cap - should ensure that resource rights continuously "flow to their highest
valued uses," thereby resulting in the most efficient aggregate use of the
resource. 1 Much of the existing literature on cap and trade policies, which
is dominated by resource economists, has focused on these twin goals of
sustainability and efficiency, hypothesizing and testing various policy
designs in terms of how well they achieve these goals.12 Other sociological
studies have shifted the focus by analyzing cap and trade policies in terms
of their social equity implications but are similar in treating cap and trade
policies as a3 given rather than a phenomenon that itself requires
explanation.1
POLITICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF CAP AND TRADE POLICIES
A number of studies have recognized the political underpinnings
of cap and trade policies, but these politics are usually derided rather than
systematically studied and incorporated into our understanding of cap and
trade programs. Illustrative, in this regard, is Hannesson's statement in the
Privatizationof the Oceans:
even if a new institution such as property rights to fish would
bring an overall gain to society it does not necessary [sic]
benefit all and harm no one. While those who expect to gain
will promote and support the new institution, those who
expect to lose will fight it with equal or greater vigor.

10. Alexander E. Farrell & M. Granger Morgan, MultilateralEmission Trading:Heterogeneity
in Domestic and InternationalCommon-PoolResource Management, in THE COMMONS IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM: CHALLENGES AND ADAPTATIONS 169,183-84 (Nives Dolak & Elinor Ostrom eds.,
2003).
11. Tietenberg, supra note 7, at 200.
12. See, e.g., Evy Crals & Lode Vereeck, Taxes, TradableRights and TransactionCosts, 20 EuR.
J.L. & EcON. 199 (2005); Diane P. Dupont et al., Profitand PriceEffects of Multi-Species Individual
Transferable Quotas, 56 J. AGRIC. ECON. 31 (2005); Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Cap and
Trade Policies in the Presence of Monopoly and Distortionary Taxation, 24 RESOURCE & ENERGY
ECON. 327 (2002); Richard G. Newell et al., FishingQuota Markets, 49 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT.
437 (2005).
13. See, e.g., RICHARD APOSTLE ET AL., ENCLOSING THE COMMONS: INDIVIDUAL
TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS IN THE NOVA SCOTIA FISHERY (2002); Matt Bradshaw, A Combinationof

State and Market ThroughITQs in the Tasmanian CommericalRock Lobster Fishery:The Tail Wagging
the Dog?, 67 FISHERIES RES. 99 (2004); Einar Eythorsson, Stakeholders, Courts, and Communities:
Individual Transferable Quotas in Icelandic Fisheries, 1991-2001, in THE COMMONS IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM, supra note 10, at 129.
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Sometimes
the gainers prevail, but at other times the losers
4
1

do.

While this is a clear recognition of the political conflicts inherent in cap and
trade programs, Hannesson's suggestion is to try to avoid such conflicts
either by "defining stakeholder groups narrowly and in such a way that
their interests are well aligned" or by developing policies in "greenfield"
situations where vested interests have had little chance to develop.15 Neither
suggestion holds much promise because cap and trade policies are most
needed and most likely to be introduced in situations of resource scarcity
and overexploitation where vested interests are already well established
and cannot be ignored. Much more realistic is Colby's observation that
"[plublic agencies and other stakeholders legitimately demand a voice in
the process of defining and allocating rights" and this needs to be
recognized even though it results in "delays, ambiguities, and transaction
costs."16 In short, the politics of cap and trade policies are a reality that
needs to be recognized and understood rather than lamented by social
scientists.
Despite the dearth of systematic analyses of the political underpinnings of cap and trade policies, many economic and sociological studies
have observed and commented on various political conflicts shaping the
operation of many real-world cap and trade policies. From these
observations, it is already possible to discern some of the politics at work in
the three distinct but inseparable processes that characterize the design and
operation of cap and trade policies: capping, allocation, and trading.
Capping-The process through which an aggregate limit on
resource use is established is known as capping. Ideally, this limit
should be set at a level so that rights holders can access and use
resource flows to support their livelihoods and communities in the
short-term without damaging the resource stock in the long-term.
In fisheries this aggregate limit is expressed as a "total allowable
catch" (TAC), in watersheds it is defined as a total diversion or
extraction limit, and in pollution control regimes it is labelled as a
total pollution load. 7 Some caps are established and then modified
very little, while others are adjusted from year to year or season to
season in response to changing stock conditions.' 8 In establishing

14.

HANNESSON, supra note 1, at 2.

15.

Id. at 108, 173.

16.

Bonnie G. Colby, Cap-and-TradePolicy Challenges: A Tale of Three Markets, 76 LAND

ECON. 638, 655 (2000).
17. Tietenberg, supra note 7, at 205-07.
18. Id.
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caps, there is often a considerable degree of uncertainty about what
exactly is a sustainable level of aggregate use for the resource in
question, leaving it open to manipulation from interests who, for
various reasons, may desire a higher or lower cap level. Moreover,
caps are usually established by politicians, government
administrators, resource users, or some combination of these actors,
so they are more likely to be the result of political accommodation
than objective scientific assessment. The perennial adjustment of
caps also means that they are subject to recurring political
challenge and are unlikely to be permanently settled.
Allocation-The allocation process involves the assignment of
resource access and use rights to individuals within the boundaries
of the established cap. These rights, typically, are defined as
percentage shares of the total cap rather than absolute volumetric
entitlements; as the cap rises and falls, so do the allocations of
rights holders.19 From the perspective of economic efficiency, the
process of distributing cap shares-or the initial allocation of
private resource rights-does not matter very much. The Coase
Theorem holds that any initial allocation of rights will eventually
result in an economically efficient distribution of rights, provided
the rights are clearly specified and there are no undue restrictions
on entitlement trading (which, as we will see below, is a big
assumption).2 ° From the perspective of the stakeholders in a shared
resource, however, the initial allocation of rights is critical. The
allocation process provides stakeholders with a scarce and valuable
asset that can potentially provide them with windfall financial
gains if traded. For those with no intention of trading for profit,
such as environmentalists, the initial allocation process offers a onetime opportunity to gain a stake in the resource that will continue
long into the future. Among all of the stakeholders jockeying for
position in the initial allocation, their relations are zero sum (given
the finite nature of the capped resource) and high stakes (given the
intended permanence of the assigned rights) in nature. Given these
intensive rivalries and efforts by various stakeholders to influence
the politicians and administrators responsible for the initial
allocation, this process is quite clearly political.
Trading-Within the bounds of the established cap and given the
prevailing distribution of resource rights, the trading process is

19. One exception to this was the initial introduction of a cap and trade program in New
Zealand fisheries. Initially, resource rights in this program were allocated on a volumetric
basis, but this was subsequently changed to a share basis. HANNESSON, supra note 1, at 89.
20. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1, 15 (1960).
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meant to continuously reallocate resource rights to their highest
valued uses.21 The built-in assumption, however, is the willingness
of lower-valued users to trade their rights for profit and exit
production. In reality, the livelihoods of many lower-valued users
are valued for cultural and social reasons, and many of them are
closely tied with local communities that have little reason for
existence if the fish or water rights of local fishers or irrigators are
traded away. Rather than quietly exiting production, some lower
valued users resist trading their rights, often through political
action seeking to preserve or erect barriers to free entitlement
trading. This also reinforces the relevance of the initial rights
allocation process, because an allocation favouring lower valued
uses is likely to create more political objections to entitlement
trading.
Quite clearly, political conflicts are prevalent in the capping,
allocation, and trading processes of cap and trade policies. As Colby
suggests, these conflicts are crucial in explaining why the operation of most
cap and trade policies has deviated from economic models: "Actual
transactions have been fewer, markets less competitive and efficiency gains
less impressive than predicted." 22 While most observers still agree that cap
and trade policies have great potential for achieving sustainability and
efficiency in the use of scarce resources, policy designs are significantly
dependent on the outcomes of political conflicts.' This article argues that
distinctive distributive conflicts are evident in each of the inter-related
processes of cap and trade policies, providing a framework for
understanding how cap and trade policies operate in real-world situations.
In the capping process, distributive conflicts between resource users and
environmentalists are prevalent; in the allocation process, distributive
conflicts between various classes of resource users are prevalent; and in the
trading process, distributive conflicts between potential buyers and sellers
are prevalent. These contentions are supported through an in-depth
analysis of the cap and trade policy recently introduced to govern water
diversions in the Murray-Darling Basin of southeastern Australia, along
with supplemental evidence from existing studies of other cap and trade

21. Tietenberg, supra note 7, at 209.
22. Colby, supra note 16, at 640.
23. Reimund Schwarze & Peter Zapfel, Sulfur Allowance Trading and the Regional Clean Air
Incentives Market: A ComparativeDesign Analysis of Two Major Cap-and-TradePermit Programs,
17 ENvTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 279 (2000).
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policies around the world.24 Each of the capping, allocation, and trading
processes is analyzed in separate sections below, and some concluding
observations are offered in the final section.
THE CAPPING PROCESS
The capping process involves the establishment of an aggregate
limit on resource use, which is subsequently divided and traded amongst
rights holders. Caps are often established in a "top-down" manner by
governmental regulators, but they may also be established collectively by
stakeholders or through government-stakeholder comanagement. In most
instances, though, an established cap is upheld by the coercive power of the
state, though cap enforcement has many challenges of its own. 25Finding the
appropriate cap level for a resource is crucial because missing the mark can
have deleterious environmental and economics consequences: a cap that is
too high can impair a resource's stock and produce irreversible
environmental damage, while a cap that is too low can result in needless
socio-economic stagnation and decline. An optimal cap level seeks longterm sustainable use, but even if this is accepted as a policy objective,
considerable uncertainty can remain. Particularly in resources whose
supplies are migratory (fish) or variable (water), it can be quite difficult to
determine technically or scientifically the precise level of aggregate use a
resource can sustain. Consequently, the capping process usually involves
a significant degree of debate, even among regulators and stakeholders who
may share the fundamental policy objective of sustainable use.
Given the basic objective of the capping process and the range of
stakeholders that is usually involved, most capping processes are
characterized by a distributive conflict between opposing interests that may
be labeled "green" and "brown." While green interests generally push for
a lower cap level (allocating more to the environment) and brown interests
push for a higher cap level (allocating more to extractive uses), this is not
simply a contest between environmentalists and extractive resource users.
For example, some green interests may be green only by circumstance such as high priority extractive users whose entitlements would become
more secure with the establishment of a stringent cap -but are green in
effect. The balance of opposing green and brown interests varies in different
resource situations, but the struggle between the opposing camps and the

24. Unless otherwise noted, the research sources for the Murray-Darling Cap come from
interviews conducted with regulators and stakeholders in early 2005. Interviewees requested
that they remain anonymous.
25. Tietenberg, supranote 7, at 215.
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extent to which they can each influence governmental regulators is
determinative in the capping process.
In the cap and trade policy introduced for water diversions in the
Murray-Darling Basin, the capping process took place during the
negotiation of the Murray-Darling Cap on Diversions, introduced in 1995.
The Cap on Diversions was introduced through the institutions of the
Murray-Darling Basin Initiative (MDBI), consisting of a Ministerial Council
comprised of land, water, and environment ministers from the
Commonwealth and Murray-Darling state governments; a Commission
comprised of senior administrators from the same governments; and a
Commission Office mandated to provide research and logistical support to
both the Ministerial Council and the Commission.26 The MDBI was created
in the context of growing water scarcity and declining water quality as
governments began to confront the over-allocation problem stemming from
almost a century of state-sponsored irrigation development.2 7 Pressure to
cap water diversions in the basin had been building for some time, and
quickly became a high agenda item for the Ministerial Council after the
MDBI was formed in 1992.28
Although a consensus on the need to cap diversions began to
emerge in the Ministerial Council as early as 1993, it was not until 1995 that
green and brown interests were able to find a cap definition that was
acceptable to both camps. 29 In the capping process, environmentalists, South
Australia, and the Commission Office took up green positions, while some
irrigators, New South Wales and Queensland, took up brown positions.
While the characterization of environmentalists as green is obvious, South
Australia was green primarily because of its position as the downstream
state in the basin: growing water scarcity had the potential to harm them
the most.3" In the Ministerial Council it was a South Australian minister,
John Klunder, who first suggested the need for a cap in a report he
presented in June 1993. 3' For its part, the Commission Office was an
important green actor primarily on scientific grounds. In 1993, it also
presented a study to the Ministerial Council clearly outlining the extent of
over-allocation threatening the basin.32 Amongst the browns, New South
Wales objected to a stringent cap limit because it had the most severe over-

26. B. Timothy Heinmiller, Partners and Competitors: Intergovernmental Relations and
the Governance of Transboundary Common Pools 171-73 (Jan. 2004) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, McMaster University) (on file with author).
27. Id. at 105-06.
28. Id. at 171-72.
29. Id. at 172.
30. Interview with anonymous participant (Mar. 2005).
31. Heinmiller, supra note 26, at 171.
32. Id. at 171-72.
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allocation problem amongst all of the Murray-Darling states and feared that
it would have to introduce substantial rollbacks in water use to comply with
a strict cap.33 Many irrigators, particularly those with low priority
entitlements, also objected for fear of rollbacks.' Queensland, in contrast,
was a relative latecomer to irrigation development and objected to a low
cap because it would stall future irrigation development.35 Ultimately, the
cap definition that was settled on and enacted was an explicit compromise
between these two sets of green and brown interests.
As in many capping processes, the settlement that was eventually
reached was to freeze resource use at roughly its current level. At a
Ministerial Council meeting in June 1995, unanimous agreement was
reached on the creation of a temporary Cap on Diversions defined as those
diversions correspondent with 1993/1994 levels of development.36 Thus, in
any given year, the prevailing Cap is calculated as "the volume of water
that would have been used with the infrastructure (pumps, dams, channels,
areas developed for irrigation, etc.) and management rules that existed in
1993/1994, assuming similar climatic and hydrologic conditions to those
experienced in the year in question." 37 By freezing diversions at the status
quo, notwithstanding climatic variations, the greens could be satisfied that
an aggregate use limit had been imposed, while the browns could be
comforted that there would be no major, immediate rollbacks. In other
words, capping at the status quo was politically expedient and ensured at
least grudging acceptance of the Cap by all major stakeholders. Since the
Cap on Diversions is designed to be mostly self-adjusting from year to year,
as climatic conditions change, recurring conflicts over the Cap definition
have not been as evident as in some cap and trade fisheries where yearly
TACs are perennially contested. Nevertheless, as many regulators and
stakeholders in the basin readily admit, the current Cap definition is not
based on a hard-nosed assessment of the basin's sustainable carrying
capacity and will likely face renegotiation in the future.

33. New South Wales' over-allocation problem was primarily attributable to the existence
of substantial amounts of "sleeper" and "dozer" licenses. A sleeper license is an entitlement
that is held but not used, while a dozer license is an entitlement that is held and only partially
used. The issue of sleepers and dozers was problematic because they constituted additional
water development that was permitted by government but not reflected in 1993/1994
development levels (the eventual cap level). This meant that the take-up of any sleeper and
dozer license would require the rollback of some existing water use, creating considerable
controversy.
34. Interview with anonymous participant (Mar. 2005).
35. Heinmiller, supra note 26, at 177-78 (2004).
36. Id. at 172.
37. MURRAY-DARLING BAsINMINSMRIALCOuNcIL, REVIEWOFTHEOPERATIONOFTHE CAP:
OVERVIEW REPORT OF THE MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMMISSION 9 (2000).
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The contest between greens and browns in the capping process is
not unique to the Murray-Darling Cap on Diversions; other studies of cap
and trade programs also reveal the outlines of this conflict in their capping
processes. In the cap and trade programs for New Zealand's fisheries,
governmental regulators are legally required to set yearly TACs at the
maximum sustainable yield for each fishery, but both environmentalist and
fishers' groups are actively involved in consulting and lobbying regulators
regarding TAC levels.3' In the past, Greenpeace has sued the Ministry of
Fisheries for setting TACs that it believes are too high, while fishers
continue to hire their own stock assessment experts to monitor and
influence the work of government administrators.3 9 Similarly, in the cap and
trade program for the Edwards Aquifer, established by the Texas legislature
in 1993, the cap for groundwater extractions established by the Edwards
Aquifer Authority has been challenged in the courts by both agricultural
interests seeking the removal of the cap and environmentalists seeking a
more stringent cap to protect threatened species. 4° In addition, the cap on
greenhouse gas emissions for developed countries established by the 1997
Kyoto Protocol (five percent below 1990 levels) was the product of five
years of negotiations between brown interests seeking a higher cap and
green interests seeking a lower cap 4 and is really only a politically
expedient starting point for emissions control rather than a scientific
assessment of the atmosphere's assimilative capacity.42 Clearly, whether it
is played out in intergovernmental, legislative, administrative, or judicial
forums, the basic distributive conflict between greens and browns seems to
be a common feature of capping processes in cap and trade programs.
Understanding the capping process in this way also provides a
clearer understanding of the nature of caps themselves. Rather than simply
a technical exercise aimed at establishing a sustainable level of resource use,
cap levels are the subject of intense political struggle and negotiation by
opposing interests. This is the case even if there is basic agreement on the
fundamental need for a cap. Relatively little attention has been paid in the
literature, thus far, to the capping process, but the outcomes from this
process can significantly shape events in the related allocation and trading
processes. A relatively low cap, for instance, may require rollbacks in
resource use, which can make the allocation process quite onerous.
Similarly, yearly and seasonal cap fluctuations are a significant determinant
of resource rights trading, with low caps usually stimulating more intensive

38.
39.
40.

HANNESSON, supra note 1, at 91-92.

41.

MICHAEL GRUBB ET AL., THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT 78 (1999).

42.

Id.

Id.
Colby, supra note 16, at 644.
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trading. For all of these reasons, the capping process is important and the
political conflicts between green and brown interests that characterize the
formation of caps must be given greater consideration.
THE ALLOCATION PROCESS
Once a cap has been established, shares of the cap must be
distributed among resource users and potential resource users in the
allocation process. For a long time, the politics of the allocation process
received relatively little attention because the Coase Theorem demonstrates
that any initial distribution of resource rights can eventually be efficient if
the rights are fully specified and tradable. From the perspective of resource
use efficiency, then, the trading process is far more important than the
initial allocation. This overlooks the fact, though, that the basic purpose of
the allocation process is to distribute scarce and valuable assets - resource
rights -among competing actors locked in a zero-sum relationship.
Experience has shown that the actors involved are well aware of this and
expend considerable effort to lay claim to these rights.43 Experience has also
shown that full specificity and tradability of resource rights are rarely found
in empirical practice,' and, in this light, the allocation process becomes
critically important because the outcomes from this process can exert
influence far into the future. Viewed in this way, the allocation process
becomes a very high stakes game for the resource users involved.
Empirical evidence suggests that a wide range of initial allocations
is possible in cap and trade policies. Tietenberg outlines four different
principles that have been used for the allocation of capped resources,
including lotteries, historic use, auctions, government-established eligibility
criteria, or some combination of these.' Raymond similarly argues that the
allocation process can be largely explained by stakeholders' contending
ideas about equity and the balancing of these ideas.47 However, while
principles and ideas are useful descriptors, it seems more likely that
allocation processes are driven by the underlying interests of the actors
involved. 48 Principles and ideas can be used and manipulated to justify a

43. HANNESSON, supranote 1, at 76 -77.
44. See Colby, supra note 16, at 640.
45. Tietenberg, supra note 7, at 208-09.
46. Id.
47. RAYMOND, supra note 3, at 1.
48. For the sake of analytical consistency, it is also important to assume that actors are
fundamentally rational and self-interested. Cap and trade policies are designed as an incentive
system to allow users to pursue their self-interest in resource use without destroying the
resource. We cannot assume that actors are rational and self-interested in the economic realm
but not in the political realm. At the same time, though, rationality is bounded and self interest
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variety of different allocations, providing principled support for the
positions of many different contending interests. Considering the high
stakes nature of the allocation process, users and potential users are
strongly motivated to protect their essential self-interests, so the allocation
process is best understood as a distributive conflict between rival user
groups presided over by governmental regulators. Unlike the capping
process, though, rival users in the allocation process do not gravitate
toward two recognizable camps (like the greens and the browns), but are
typically multiple and highly fragmented.
In the Murray-Darling Cap on Diversions, a single allocation
process was undertaken at the highest governance level, between the states,
while many simultaneous allocation processes subsequently took place
within the states, at the lowest governance levels. The latter processes
featured various forms of stakeholder consultation and comanagement at
the sub-basin level, providing ample opportunity for actors seeking to lay
claim to resource shares. Since an account of all these lower level allocation
processes is impossible, the allocation process in the Murrumbidgee subbasin in New South Wales is used as an illustrative example. Regardless of
governance level, however, the allocation processes were all characterized
by distributive conflicts among multiple potential users.
At the basin level, the rival actors were the Murray-Darling states.
In the wake of the Cap agreement in 1995, each tried to capture as large a
share of the basin's water resources as possible, recognizing it as possibly
their last chance to stake such a claim. Although each state had agreed in
principle to cap its water diversions at 1993/1994 levels of development,
each of them also made various appeals for exceptions to this counon
standard, seeking a greater share of the basin's water.a9 In an effort to
resolve these contending claims, the Ministerial Council created the
Independent Audit Group (IAG) in 1996, mandating it to investigate and
recommend solutions.' Comprised of Paul Baxter and Dr. Wally Cox, two
well-respected experts in the water management field, the IAG undertook
an investigation of the various states' claims for exemptions under the Cap,
accepting some but trying to adhere as closely as possible to the basin-wide
standard."1 In the end, New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia each
agreed to slightly modified Cap shares, while Queensland and the
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) have yet to agree to a formal Cap share
but still participate in the program. 2 As in the capping process, Queensland
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argued that it got a later start in irrigation development compared to its
southern neighbors and should be left room in its Cap share to allow for
future growth, while the ACT argued that it needed room in its Cap
definition to allow for the growth of Canberra.5 3 Thus, the interstate
allocation of Cap shares was the product of competing claims between rival
state governments and, in the case of Queensland and the ACT, still
remains somewhat unsettled.
When Cap allocation processes were eventually initiated within
each state, distributive conflicts between multiple user groups also quickly
emerged, the rivalries varying according to the unique circumstances of
each area. In the Murrumbidgee sub-basin of New South Wales, the
distributive conflicts in the allocation process were particularly heated
because of a required rollback in water use: a total of 2,998 GL of water
entitlements existed in this sub-basin, but the projected long-term cap was
only 1,925 GL.54 Beyond these figures, other factors were also important.
Past practices by government regulators had routinely allowed "offallocations" of surplus water to irrigators without entitlement, creating even
more reliance on Murrumbidgee water than the 2,998 GL figure indicates.
Furthermore, among the 2,998 GL of existing entitlements, an unspecified
number were "sleepers and dozers," meaning that the entitlements were
recognized by the state but were unused or partially used by their holders.
This set the stage for a conflict between those relying on "off-allocations"
(using the resource but not having a formal entitlement) and those holding
"sleepers and dozers" (having a formal entitlement but not using the
resource).5 5 Another conflict also quickly emerged between high security
entitlement holders (generally horticulturalists and viticulturalists) and
general security entitlement holders (generally wheat, hay, and rice
farmers), the former enjoying priority in allocation over the latter. 6 Given
this arrangement, any rollbacks would threaten the reliability of general
security allocations while having little effect on the reliability of high
security allocations, creating an obvious source of contention.5 7 Neither did
the general security irrigators welcome the introduction of a new user
group in the sub-basin-the environment-which under the New South
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Wales Water Management Act was recognized as a legitimate user of water
and given an even higher allocation priority than the high security
irrigators.5 8
Under the terms of the Water Management Act, comanagement
arrangements were used to allocate Cap shares in each of the sub-basins in
New South Wales, with the final water sharing plans requiring Cabinet
approval.59 In the Murrumbidgee, the Murrumbidgee River Management
Committee (MRMC) was created in 2000, comprised of representatives from
irrigators' groups, local governments, national environmentalist groups,
local conservation groups, and four New South Wales government
departments, as well as an independent chair. 6 The Water Management Act
purposely prioritized some user groups over others, and the water sharing
plan that eventually emerged was the product of heated negotiations within
the MRMC on this somewhat uneven playing field, as well as some last
ditch government intervention.61 At the outset, the government chose to
recognize all sleeper and dozer licenses in the Act, virtually extinguishing
the practice of off-allocations. Domestic users, municipal users, the
environment, and high security entitlement holders, respectively, were also
recognized as having top priority in water allocations,62 so general security
irrigators were caught in a desperate struggle to secure adequate water
rights to maintain their livelihoods. Consensus among the MRMC members
proved impossible and the struggle became so acrimonious that the New
South Wales Cabinet ultimately had to intervene.63 A water sharing plan
was imposed that was designed to comply with the long-term Cap, but tied
some environmental allocations to general security allocations, effectively
elevating the priority of the latter over that envisioned in the Water
Management Act.' This was clearly a government-engineered political
compromise among contending user groups, a common feature of
allocation processes in capped resources.
Allocation processes in other cap and trade programs have also
been characterized by intensive user rivalries settled through negotiation
and government intervention. In Nova Scotia, for example, cap and trade

58. 2003 WATER REFORM ASSESSMENT, supra note 54, at 52.
59. PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, supra note 57, at 13.
60. Kathleen H. Bowmer, AgriculturefortheAustralianEnvironment- Learningfrom Existing
Practice:Reflections on Developing a Water Sharing Plan, in AGRICULTURE FOR THE AUSTRALIAN
ENVIRONMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2002 FENNER CONFERENCE ON THE ENVIRONMENT 201, 207

(B.P. Wilson & A. Curtis eds., 2002), available at http://www.csu.edu.au/special/fenner/
papers/ref/TOC.html.
61. Interview with anonymous participant (Mar. 2005).
62. 2003 WATER REFORM ASSESSMENT, supra note 54, at 52.
63. Interview with anonymous participant (Mar. 2005)
64. Id.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

policies were introduced to govern declining groundfish stocks, and the
allocation process was conducted through comanagement arrangements
that combined committees of local fishers with government oversight.65 The
committee meetings were highly contentious affairs as users jockeyed for
position to stake their claims to a part of the capped resource. In the words
of one participant:
there were meetings where, if you had 10 sitting around the
table negotiating, "you knew six of these guys were
negotiating a deal that would put [the other four] out of
business. We had some tough, tough meetings. We didn't
have fistfights, but we went 3 or 4 days where guys never
spoke to each other."'
In another case, the Alaskan pollock fishery, the allocation process for the
yearly TAC has been dominated by both competition between the inshore
and offshore fishing fleets and a legislative requirement that at least a small
portion of the TAC be allocated to remote coastal communities in western
Alaska for the purposes of economic development.67 In the Kyoto Protocol,
distributive conflicts in the allocation process were also quite prevalent.
One example was the effort of well-forested countries, such as Russia,
Canada, and Australia, who successfully lobbied to receive credits for their
"carbon sinks" effectively reducing their shares of greenhouse gas
reductions. Another was the struggle amongst European Union countries
over the sub-division of their collective Kyoto share.'
As all of these cases suggest, the allocation process is best
characterized as a high stakes distributive conflict between multiple
resource users, often in the shadow of governmental regulators.
Consequently, rights allocations are usually produced through a balancing
of competing interests as well as the implementation of government
priorities for resource use. The balancing of competing user interests is not
only reflected in the cases described above, but in the fact that historic use
is the most common method for allocating resource rights to capped
resources. 6" Relying on historic use is an explicit recognition of existing
vested interests in a resource, and the continuation of these interests under
a cap and trade policy. The importance of government resource use
priorities in the allocation process was particularly evident in the MurrayDarling case but is also reflected in the fact that historic use is not always the
allocation method of choice. Governments usually have the authority to
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disrupt historic resource use patterns, and, particularly in resources where
rollbacks are required, they can face some difficult choices in allocating
resource use. While the relative significance of competing users and
government priorities varies across different resources, both have a
formative role to play in the allocation process.
THE TRADING PROCESS
One of the purported benefits of cap and trade policies is their
dynamism; the trading of resource rights allows for continuous adaptation
to changing social, economic, and environmental conditions by allowing for
the reallocation of rights between existing users and from existing users to
new users. For economists, this trading process is regarded as beneficial
because it has the potential to encourage resource use efficiency, provided
that the trading of entitlements is free and open.7' Under these conditions,
resource rights tend to flow to their highest valued uses, ensuring that a
scarce resource is used in the most economically beneficial way. More
recently, some environmentalists have also lauded the benefits of resource
rights trading for environmental protection.7' In some jurisdictions,
governments have been persuaded to recognize environmentalists as
legitimate rights holders and environmentalist groups have purchased
resource rights and retired them, effectively leaving more of the resource
in the environment for ecological purposes.72 Despite these economic and
environmental benefits, however, the potential dynamism of cap and trade
programs is not usually welcomed by all users.
While it has generally been assumed that trading of resource rights
in a cap and trade program is a positive sum relationship between buyers
and sellers, experience shows that the relationship between buyers and
sellers can be quite antagonistic, prompting significant regulation by
governments. Potential sellers of resource rights - usually low valued
users - may resist selling their rights despite anticipated windfalls because
these rights form the fundamental basis of livelihoods, communities, and
cultures that are valued beyond economic calculus. In these cases, sellers
may appeal to governments for regulatory protections that obstruct
resource trading and protect the current rights allocation. Potential buyers
can be equally frustrated in the buyer-seller relationship if sellers refuse to
sell or have succeeded in erecting regulatory barriers to trade. They may
also take their cases to governmental regulators applying pressure for
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increased trade liberalization. In this light, the trading process is not simply
about market transactions, but is often a political struggle between potential
sellers and potential buyers, each of whom exerts pressure on governmental
regulators in an attempt to establish market regulations that suit their
respective interests.
In the Murray-Darling Basin, the water rights trading process was
not undertaken through the basin-level MDBI, but through the nationallevel Council of Australian Governments (COAG) and its water reform
framework. The COAG is an intergovernmental council comprised of the
Commonwealth and all the state governments. Water rights reform came
on its agenda in the early 1990s as part of a Commonwealth-led effort
toward economic deregulation in the states. The water reform framework
was signed in 1994 and committed the state governments to a schedule of
measures that would ultimately result in water trading. 73 Among the most
important of these measures is the formal specification of water
entitlements, the separation of water entitlements from land ownership, the
gradual liberalization of market trading in water entitlements, and the
incremental introduction of full-cost pricing for water deliveries.74 The
framework also recognizes the environment "as a legitimate user of water"
and calls for allocations to be made to protect the environment in areas that
are "over-allocated" or "stressed."7' In 1995, the framework was rolled into
the broader National Competition Policy (NCP) making the state governments eligible for generous "tranche payments" from the Commonwealth
for implementing its provisions. 76 Consequently, substantial water rights
reforms were undertaken by the state governments and the movement
toward water rights trading has accelerated even further under the NCP's
successor, the 2003 National Water Initiative.77
Although the development of the water reform framework
paralleled the Murray-Darling Cap on Diversions, the provisions of the Cap
firmly recognize and support the introduction of water trading at both the
interstate and intrastate levels. At the interstate level, a water trading
program between the states has been introduced, but conflicts between
buying states and selling states have impeded its development. The
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archetypal conflict here is between New South Wales and South Australia,
with the bulk of their interstate water trade moving, thus far, from low
value wheat and rice irrigators in New South Wales to high value
viticulturalists in South Australia. 78 Given the one-way tendency of this
trade, the New South Wales government has viewed this as a threat to its
irrigation sector, in which it invested heavily for almost a century, and it has
done its best to stonewall any further growth in interstate trade, despite its
intergovernmental commitments to the contrary. 79 Continued resistance will
be more difficult under the National Water Initiative, which pledges even
further liberalization of interstate water trading in the Murray-Darling, and
s
further conflict is likely.8
In the Murrumbidgee sub-basin, conflicts between potential buyers
and sellers have also dominated the trading process. Under the New South
Wales Water Management Act, water trading within the state is
encouraged, but any trade must occur between areas that are hydrologically
linked and must comply with the relevant water sharing plan(s) in the
trading area(s).81 Because the introduction of the Cap has made water rights
a scarcer commodity, demand from potential buyers has grown, but so has
resistance from reluctant potential sellers. For example, the two main
irrigation cooperatives in the Murrumbidgee, Murrumbidgee Irrigation and
Coleambally Irrigation, developed internal rules that allowed water
entitlements to be traded into them but not out. They fear that the export of
even a small proportion of their members' water rights, and their retirement
from irrigated production, could leave the remaining members of the
cooperatives with an untenable burden in supporting the existing canal and
storage infrastructure." Furthermore, the exit of local producers puts the
viability of local economies and local communities at risk, just for the sake
of a quick and easy windfall for a select few. In late 2004, New South Wales
regulators and Murrumbidgee Irrigation concluded an agreement that
would allow up to four percent of its members' entitlements to be traded
out in each of the next five years, but the removal of such trading barriers
has proven to be much more onerous than originally envisioned in the
Strategic Water Reform Framework. 3
The Murray-Darling case shows how the division between buyers
and sellers in the trading process can be territorially based, between states,
and between communities, but other cap and trade examples suggest
further divisions as well. In the U.S. surf clam fishery, the trading process
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features a conflict between older generation rights holders, who rent their
entitlements on a yearly basis rather than sell them permanently, and
younger generation fishers who are forced to rent these entitlements but
would prefer to buy them. This has created a considerable degree of
"absentee ownership of quotas," frustrating young fishers with ambitions
of ownership and prompting them to pressure the government for changes
to the trading rules.' Another conflict that has been noted in the trading
processes of many cap and trade fisheries is between small businesses and
large, vertically integrated corporations, the latter tending to use their
purchasing power to acquire the fishing rights of the former, creating
problems of concentrated rights ownership. In Nova Scotia, Iceland, and
elsewhere, restrictions on concentrated ownership have been introduced by
governments to combat this problem and protect small business owners in
the trading process.'a All of these examples reinforce the notion that the
dynamic between buyers and sellers in the trading process is not always
one of mutual benefit, and that diverging interests may seek to manipulate
the process for their own ends.
In cap and trade policies, the trading process is fundamentally
political in nature. Those who hold resource rights not only hold a valuable
asset, they also hold the basis upon which livelihoods, communities, and
cultures may be constructed. This gives rights holders a considerable
amount of power and makes the trading process crucially important for a
wide range of actors associated with potential buyers and sellers. In this
way, the trading of resource rights is not simply a market transaction but
a socio-economic reshaping of resource dependent industries and
communities. With so much at stake, it is not surprising that potential
buyers and sellers seek to influence governmental regulators to design
trading rules in their favour. Regulators may also have their own priorities
for the reallocation of resource rights, and when these are balanced with
pressures from contending interests, politically derived trading rules result.
Ultimately, potential buyers and sellers know that, if the prevailing trading
rules are not advantageous to them, they can always seek new trading
regimes that are.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
As shown above, cap and trade policies are shaped by distributive
political conflicts in their capping, allocation, and trading processes, causing
them to deviate - sometimes quite considerably - from the ideal cap and
trade models put forward by economists. This does not mean that these
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ideal economic models lack value; it simply means that the introduction and
implementation of cap and trade policies is explicitly political and should
be recognized and analyzed as such. In Hannesson's words:
The political authorities that finally decide whether or not to
put in place property rights in fisheries, and how these rights
are to be defined, are therefore subject to a multitude of forces
pulling in different directions, and there are many
possibilities with regard to what the final outcome will be.
The outcome is more often than not a compromise deviating
from the blueprint an economic-institutional analysis might
come up with.86
This suggests that economic models can be used as a starting point for
understanding cap and trade policies, but that the distributive conflicts
shaping the actual design and operation of these policies must be given
more consideration than they have been given thus far.
One partial exception involves the implementation of cap and trade
policies in "greenfield" situations in which a resource has been largely
unexploited and vested interests in the resource have had little chance to
develop. In these situations, there are few actors fighting for a specific cap
level, for a larger allocation of the cap, or for favourable trading rules, so the
potential for faithful implementation of ideal economic models is much
greater, particularly if there is commitment to the model by governmental
regulators. These "greenfield" situations, however, are relatively rare.
Generally, cap and trade policies are most needed and most often
implemented in resources that are overexploited and rife with vested
interests, precisely the opposite of "greenfield" situations. 7 As a result,
limiting cap and trade programs to "greenfield" situations to avoid
distributive conflicts is not a viable option, and the politics involved in their
design and implementation must be analyzed rather than avoided.
In this regard, three concluding observations about the politics of
cap and trade policies are appropriate. First, and most obvious from the
discussion above, each of the three processes comprising cap and trade
programs features a different type of distributive political conflict that can
significantly influence the design and operation of these programs. Second,
each of the three processes operates on a different temporal cycle, meaning
that some of these conflicts are persistent or recurring while others are not.
Finally, government has a crucial role to play in each of the processes, but
the widespread adoption of comanagement mechanisms also suggests the
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importance of stakeholder participation. Each of these observations is
elaborated briefly below.
Evidence from the Murray-Darling Cap on Diversions and other
cap and trade programs around the world suggests that the capping,
allocation, and trading processes are characterized by a variety of
distributive political conflicts. In the capping process, this conflict is
between two loosely united groups, the "greens" and the "browns," the
former pushing for a lower cap level to leave more of the resource for the
environment and the latter pushing for a higher cap to allocate more of the
resource to its extractive users. This can be contrasted with the allocation
process in which a large number of current and potential users jockey with
each other to claim a share of the capped resource in an effort to secure a
valuable asset and/or to ensure the continued viability of their respective
livelihoods. In the trading process, a further conflict is evident between
"buyers" and "sellers" of resource shares, each trying to tilt the trading
rules in their favour either so that their resource rights are protected from
trade or their ability to buy resource rights is facilitated by regulatory rules.
The recognition of these conflicts is also a recognition that resource users do
more than simply buy and sell resource rights in cap and trade programs;
they may also seek advantage in political processes, creating considerable
political conflict when actors with diverging interests pursue this strategy
simultaneously.
What remains to be considered, however, is how these capping,
allocation, and trading processes fit together and what implications this has
for the various political conflicts inherent in these processes. While each of
the three processes is a necessary part of cap and trade policies, it is
important to recognize that each operates on a somewhat different temporal
cycle. For instance, consider the difference between the capping and
allocation processes: the establishment of caps is a relatively rare event,
with caps often being established on a seasonal or annual basis; in contrast,
the allocation process is usually just a one-shot process with the rights
allocation remaining constant over time (notwithstanding trades) as cap
levels fluctuate.' The trading process is different again, as it is a relatively
continuous process with the potential for trading to occur on an almost
daily basis. These differences in temporal scale are important because they
reveal that allocation conflicts are likely to be acute but short-term, capping
conflicts are likely to be recurring and predictable, and trading conflicts are
likely to be persistent and continuous. Thus, the conflicts between " greens "
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and "browns" and "buyers" and "sellers" are a permanent fixture of cap
and trade policies and can be expected to dominate the operation and
reform of these policies once the initial allocation of resource shares has
been made.
Finally, governments have a crucial role in all three cap and trade
program processes. The undertaking of caps, the allocation of resource
rights, and the establishment of resource trading rules all fundamentally
depend on the sovereign authority of governments. Even in the midst of
strong pressures from powerful stakeholders, legislators and administrators
exercise an important degree of autonomy and their priorities and
discretion are formative, and sometimes decisive, in the design and
operation of cap and trade policies. Ultimately, rule changes in any of the
three processes must have the support, or at least complicity, of government
in order to take effect. Comanagement arrangements are a common element
of cap and trade policies, and they are one of the means through which
contending stakeholders express their divergent interests to governmental
actors. Almost without exception, though, these comanagement
arrangements reserve the final decision on cap levels, resource allocations,
and trading restrictions to governmental regulators, maintaining their
decisive role. In the end, the decisions of legislators and administrators can
make or break the success of cap and trade policies, regardless of other
circumstances.

